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1. Introduction 
1.1 Topic  
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the contribution that the case law of the UN 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter the “ICTR”) has given to the 
interpretation of the protected groups in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 19481 (hereafter the “Genocide Convention” 
or the “Convention”) including the scope of these protected groups. Of the four 
protected groups set out in Article II; national, ethnical, racial and religious , the main 
focus in this thesis will be on ethnic group as this is the most relevant protected group in 
the ICTR’s jurisprudence. Several questions can be asked regarding these issues; what 
did the Convention drafters mean by protected group? What are the criteria for 
belonging to a group protected by the Convention? Further, is there any objective test 
for identifying such groups?  
  
 
When the ICTR was established in 1994,2 Art. II of the Convention was adopted mutatis 
mutandis in the Statute of the ICTR Art. 23. The same provision was also adopted in the 
Statute of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter 
the “ICTY”) and in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter the 
“ICC”). This implies that the jurisprudence of these the ICTR (in addition to the ICTY 







1 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. Approved and 
proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly Resolution 260 A (III) of 9 
December 1948. Entred into force on 12 January 1951   
2 Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 
3 The Statute is available at www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html 
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genocide. However, it is to be noted that the ICTR does not have a formal role of 
interpreting the Genocide Convention as opposed to for example the European Court of 
Human Rights4 that is a mechanism set up by the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms5 in order to ensure the enforcement in the 
Convention’s obligations. The Genocide Convention and the ICTR are two separate 
legal instruments and the ICTR has thus no formal competence set out in the Covention 
as regards to the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. 
  
The concept of protected groups is of vital importance in order to establish whether 
genocide has taken place. If the targeted group is not within the definition and scope of 
a protected group under the Genocide Convention, genocide can not legally be 
established. Thus, the determination of whether a group is protected or not, is essential 
in the process of establishing whether genocide has occurred. Article II of the Genocide 
Convention reads; 
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such: 
a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 








4 The European Court of Human Rights, cf. the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Set up in 
1959 
5 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950 
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The Genocide Convention and corresponding customary international rules require both 
objective and subjective elements for individual criminal responsibility for genocide to 
arise. The objective element has two aspects; first, it is related to the prohibited five 
acts. The second aspect of the objective element relates to the targeted group. The group 
has to be national, racial, ethnical or religious. Moreover, the subjective element (mens 
rea) must be present. To convict a person of genocide, the provision that the perpetrator 
has to have an intention to destroy the victim group must be fulfilled6 and the protected 
groups is an element of the special intent which is required in order to constitute 
genocide.7
 
Our time has been named the century of genocide.8  Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, the 
Armenian genocide and the Holocaust are all examples of unthinkable atrocities. In 
1994 about 800,0009 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in Rwanda. In September 
1998 the ICTR, in the Akayesu-case10, delivered the first-ever judgement on the crime 
of genocide by an international court. The ICTR has handed down 17 judgements 
involving 23 accused, where of them has been acquitted. Another 25 accused are 
currently on trial11. 
 
In the following, I shall first present the background of the Genocide Convention, and 







6 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, p.96, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.98-105 
7 The special intent that is required has the character of subjective surplus 
8 Roger Smith; State Power and Genocidal Intent: on the Uses of Genocide in the Twentieth Century” in 
Chorbajian&Shirinian (red.), 1999, p.3 
9 The numbers vary, and the exact number of lives lost will never be known. This number is based on 
Alison Des Forges;  Leave No One to Tell the Story, Human Rights Watch Report 1999 p.15. Another 
researcher, Filip Reyntjens in “Estimation du nombre de personnes tuèes au Rwanda en 1994” in 
L’Afrique des Grands Lacks: Annuarie 1996-97, Paris, p. 182 estimated that over a million lost their lives 
in Rwanda in 1994, some 600.000 of these were Tutsi and 500.00 were Hutu. 
10 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement of 2 September 1998 
11 Cf. www.ictr.org and www.trial-ch.org  
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prior to the ICTR. The purpose is not to give an exhaustive of all contributions in the 
discussion of the protected groups but a kind of status quo prior to the ICTR as far as 
possible. Then I will analyse the ICTR’s interpretation of protected groups under Art. II 
of the Genocide Convention, and their scope. As mentioned above, the emphasis will be 
on ethnic groups. For the purpose of comparison I will also touch upon relevant 
judgements given by the ICTY. Finally, under Chapter 5, I will try to summarise and 
draw some conclusions on the developments by the ICTR on protected groups. 
2. The Genocide Convention – general background 
 
2.1 The development of the term genocide and the adoption of the 
Convention 
The crime of genocide was initially only a sub-category of crimes against humanity, 
thus neither Art. 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Major 
War Criminals (Nuremberg) nor Art. II (1) of Control Council Law no.10,12 did 
explicitly envisage genocide as a separate category of these crimes. It has, however, 
been held that the wording of the mentioned provisions shows that those crimes 
encompassed genocide.13 Moreover, genocide was explicitly discussed in the Polish 
Supreme Court judgement, known as the Hoess-case14. Genocide was also discussed in 








12 The Control Council Law no. 10 was “multinational” legislation, passed by the four victorious Powers 
four months after the London Agreement, on 20 December 1945 
13 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, p.96, 2003 
14 Poland v. Hoess (1948) 7 LRTWC 11 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland). Hoess, a Nazi 
commandant at Auschwitz was sentenced to death by a Polish national tribunal. 
15 United States v. Greifelt et al. (1948) 13 LRTWC 1 (United States Military Tribunal), p.17 
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The term “genocide” is relatively new, but today a widely spread and common term. It 
is very much contested and some would say rather overused.16  Winston Churchill once 
called genocide “the crime without a name”.17  The concept genocide was a direct 
response to the Holocaust and the atrocities during World War II.18  The term is rooted 
in two related sources: First, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-American scholar in 
international criminal law, invented the word in 1943 as he tried to define the Nazis’ 
atrocities against the Jews.19 He created the term from two words; genos, which means 
race, nation or tribe in ancient Greek and caedere, which means to kill in Latin. 
Moreover, in 1944, Lemkin defined genocide as “a coordinated plan of different 
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of a national group, 
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves”.20
 
During and after World War II, Lemkin was a driving force in the work for an 
international codification of the crime of genocide.21 In 1948 the United Nations 
(hereafter the “UN”) codified the crime of genocide in the Genocide Convention22 and it 
thus gained autonomous significance as a specific crime. The Genocide Convention was 
the end of Raphael Lemkin’s long struggle and lobbying for codifying genocide as an 
international crime.23 It was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 







16 See Eric D. Weitz , A century of genocide, p.8, Princeton University Press 2003 
17 Cf. Leo Kuper, Genocide, Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, Yale University Press 1981 
18 Dinah L. Shelton (ed. in chief) Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, volume 1, 
p.396 
19 Eric D. Weitz , A century of genocide, p.8, Princeton University Press 2003 
20 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress, Washington, 1944, p.79 
21 Eric Markusen; Hvad er folkemord – en søgen efter svar. Published in Folkemord.Den jyske historiker 
nr.90/2000, p.5. Available at www.dchf.dk/publications_dk/den_jyske_hist/markusen_djh.html 
22 (1951) 78 UNTS 277 
23 Eric Markusen; Hvad er folkemord – en søgen efter svar. Published in Folkemord.Den jyske historiker 
nr.90/2000, p.5 
24 (1951) 78UNTS 277 
  6 
                                                                                                                                              
was a major step forward and the establishment of the Convention signalised that there 
were actually limits for state-sponsored atrocities and that impunity could not be 
tolerated.26 The drafting of the Genocide Convention was thus considered as an 
important advance in international law. First, the sole existence of the Convention is in 
itself very important. Secondly, it sets out a definition of the crime of genocide (Art. II). 
Moreover, it punishes other acts connected to genocide, such as conspiracy, complicity 
etc. (Art. III). It prohibits genocide regardless of whether it is perpetrated in wartime or 
in time of peace (Art. IV). Furthermore, the Convention considers genocide as both a 
crime which involve the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator and as an 
international offence entailing the responsibility of the State, whose authorities engage 
(or participate) in the genocide. 
 
The Genocide Convention was the first of several international treaties making the basis 
for the modern system of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, despite the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention’s goal to “liberate mankind from such an odious 
scourge,”27 genocide continued to take place for the next decades (e.g. the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda). It was first when the Convention’s definition of genocide was 
copied in the Statutes of the ICTY (1993) and the ICTR (1994) that the Genocide 
Convention was applied in an actual court case.28 Up and until today, both the ICTY 










25 See The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, web site: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/1.htm 
26 William Schabas; The genocide Convention at Fifty, Special report 41. Available at www.usip.org 
27 Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the Genocide Convention 
28 The first judgement on genocide based on the Genocide Convention and given by an international 
tribunal was the conviction of Jean-Paul Akayesu by the ICTR on 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T 
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2.2 Article II of the Genocide Convention 
In Article II of the Convention its four protected groups are listed. This article has been 
called “the heart of the Convention,” 29 and defines genocide as the intentional 
destruction of one of the four protected groups by killing or causing seriously bodily or 
mental harm to members of a group, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring 
about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intending 
to prevent births within the group, or with force transferring children from one group to 
another. A common short version of the definition is “the intentional killing, 
destruction, or extermination of groups or members of a group as such”.30  
 
 
2.3 The status of the Crime of Genocide as International Customary law 
Beyond the Convention the prohibition of genocide also forms part of customary 
international law.31  In the Bagilishema-case32, the ICTR stated that “the Genocide 
Convention is undeniably considered part of customary international law, as reflected 
in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (1951) on reservations to 







29 Cf. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, p.72, Cambridge University Press, 2000 
30 Cf. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, p.96, Oxford University Press, 2003 
31 Cf. Andreas Zimmermann , Prosecuting the Crime of Genocide: The Role of National Courts, 
International Criminal Tribunals and the International Court of Justice,  Mennesker og Rettigheter nr.2, 
2003 
32 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgement of 7 June 2001. Ignace Bagilishema 
was the bourgmestre of Mabanza. He was acquitted by the ICTR and the acquittal was confirmed by the 
Appeals Chamber in July 2002 
33 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgement of 7 June 2001, para.54.  
34 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana. Case No, ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, para.88. Clemènt 
Kayishema, a medical doctor from Kibuye, where he was Prefect of Kibuye. He was found guilty of 
genocide by the ICTR and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed on 1 June 2001 and 
he now serves his sentence in Mali. Obed Ruzindana, a Businessman in Kibuye, was found guilty of 
  8 
                                                                                                                                              
stated that the crime of genocide is considered a part of international customary law and 
moreover a norm of jus cogens.35 This was confirmed by the ICTY which stated in the 
Krstic-case36 that despite being adopted during the same period the term genocide itself 
was coined, the Genocide Convention has been viewed as codifying a norm of 
international law long recognized and which case-law would soon elevate to the level of 
a peremptory norm of general international law; jus cogens.37 Consequently, it may be 
said that genocide is prohibited in all states, also in those states which have not adopted 
the Convention. 
3. Legal Context 
3.1 The prohibited groups - general 
The Genocide Convention does not protect all kind of groups. The groups protected are, 







genocide and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed on 1 June 2001 and he is 
today imprisoned in Mali. 
35 Jus cogens can be defined as “compelling” or “higher” law that transcends the limitations of national 
laws and which no country can violate with impunity 
36 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic,IT-98-33, 2 August 2001. Radislav Krstic was a general of the Drina 
Corps of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina/Republika Srpska. He was convicted of 
genocide, violations of the laws or customs of war, and crimes against humanity, and sentenced to 46 
years imprisonment. However, on 4 April 2004, the Appeals Chamber in its judgement confirmed the 
finding that acts of genocide had taken place in Srebrenica. It nevertheless held that Krstic was a mere 
accomplice to genocide. According to the judgment, the latter's participation consisted in aiding and 
abetting acts of genocide rather than instigating such acts. According to the Appeals Chamber, Krstic 
knew that by allowing Drina Corps resources to be used he was making a substantial contribution to the 
execution of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. It added that "although the evidence suggests that Radislav 
Krstic was not a supporter of that plan, as Commander of the Drina Corps he permitted the Main Staff to 
call upon Drina Corps resources and to employ those resources". The Appeals Chamber sentenced Krstic 
to 35 years imprisonment. He serves his sentence in Great Britain. 
37 Prosecutor v. Krstic,IT-98-33, 2 August 2001, para.541 
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these four groups are not clearly defined in the Convention, neither elsewhere. It has 
been pointed out that the four concepts are in themselves imprecise.38  
 
The use of concepts of protected groups and national minorities partially overlap and 
are in some cases synonymous in the work on the protection of minorities by 
international bodies. In some European instruments, as for example the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Art.14), the term “national minorities” is used. Other 
international instruments more commonly refer to “ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities.”39 Moreover, the preparatory work on the Genocide Convention also reflects 
that the term “ethnical” was added at a later stage in order to better define the type of 
the protected groups and ensure that the term “national” would not be understood as 
encompassing purely political groups.40
 
Scholars soon found reasons to criticise the definition of what constitutes a protected 
group, together with other aspects of the Convention. The Convention was, after all, a 
result of compromise between the different states (at the time the UN had only fifty-
eight member states) that was participating in the discussions leading to its wording and 
several analysts have argued that the Convention’s definition of genocide in the end 







38 See Genocide in International Law, William A. Schabas, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.110 
39 Cf. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “In those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language” 
40 Cf. UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Petren, Sweden); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Petren, Sweden) 
41 Lori Brun; Beyond the 1948 Genocide Convention: Emerging Principles of Genocide in International 
Law”, Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade, Vol.17, p.197 (1993) 
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that some states wanted to narrow the Convention’s definitional parameters of genocide. 
This was necessary to exclude many of their own current, as well as past, policies.42
 
It has been claimed that the Genocide Convention is both too broad and too narrow, 
besides being poorly and unclear written, and it is said that nearly everyone considers 
the Convention to be insufficient for one reason or another.43
 
A main issue in criticism against the Genocide Convention has been the exclusion of 
political groups, and the fact that it does not embrace groups defined by their class 
background. Furthermore, the Convention does not include cultural genocide. It has 
been claimed that the definition of the protected groups represents the Convention’s 
gravest weakness; “The major problem with the Convention is its narrow definition of 
what constitutes a victim group… .”44 Leo Kuper stated that “I believe a major 
omission to be in the exclusion of political groups from the list of groups protected”.45
 
During the negotiations leading to the Genocide Convention the issue of which groups 
that were to be included was difficult.46 It was argued that the elimination of a political 
group may not fit with the notion of genocide and that cultural genocide would also lead 
to problems. Thus, political, cultural and economic genocide were not included in the 
Convention. Consequently, the Convention concentrates on the protection of groups that 







42 Ward Churchill, A little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the 
present,1997, p. 410 
43 Eric D. Weitz , A century of genocide, p.9, Princeton University Press 2003 
44 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn; The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, 
1990, p.11 
45 Leo Kuper; Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century. New Haven, 1981, p.39 
46 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, p.96, Oxford University Press, 2003 and Eric D. Weitz , 
A century of genocide, p.8, Princeton University Press 2003 
47 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, p.97, Oxford University Press, 2003 
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As political and social groups are often the targets of severe political violence this 
narrow definition of protected groups has been widely criticized. The elements of legal 
definition lead to many difficult questions and it has been argued that several of the 
elements in fact run counter to general moral understandings of the term. An example is 
that one might have a case of genocide involving a few causalities or a situation of 
extreme brutality that does not meet the definition (for example mass murder of political 
groups). Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn argue in The History and Sociology of 
Genocide48 that the Convention’s main problem is its narrow definition of what 
constitutes a protected group. Leo Kuper’s comment to this is that “many nations were 
unwilling to renounce the right to commit political genocide against their own 
nationals”.49  
 
The first two drafts of the Convention originally included political groups, but several 
UN member states were against it (amongst them the Soviet Union)50 and political 
groups were removed from the Convention in the final draft. In a report on the Genocide 
Convention published in 1985, Benjamin Whitaker stated that “(…) leaving political or 
other groups beyond the purported protection of the Convention offers a wide and 
dangerous loophole which permits any designated group to be exterminated, ostensibly 
under the excuse that it is for political reasons”.51
 
It has been claimed that the Genocide Convention on one side protects group members 







48 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn; The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, 
1990, p.11 
49 Leo Kuper; Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century. New Haven, 1981, p.29  
50 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2000, p.140 
51 Benjamin Whitaker; revised and Updated report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, New York, United Nations (Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, p.19, para.36 
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characteristics, for example the ethnic community into which a person is born. On the 
other hand, to the extent that the Convention endorses a vision of a community life 
based on a group division, it does so only with respect to those groups listed in the 
Convention’s Art. II and only with respect to certain types of physical attacks. Thus, it 
has been claimed that if three equal brutal schemes were carried out, one based on 
random terror, another targeted against political opponents or another social class, and 
the third carried out against a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group”, then only 
the third would actually constitute genocide according to Art.II of the Genocide 
Convention.52   
 
As a response to these problems, scholars have suggested different interpretations which 
cover most forms of state-sponsored mass killing. Leo Kuper for example suggests a 
broader understanding of the crime in order to tackle problems arising from the 
Convention’s technical language. It has also been suggested to use new terms as 
democide (R.J. Rummel) referring to all types of mass state murder.53  
Regarding cultural genocide, it has been pointed out that the essence of genocide is the 
deliberate destruction of a human group.54 It has further been argued that such 
destruction may be the case by the disintegration of the political and social institutions, 
of culture, languages, national feelings, religion and the economic existence and not 
only by killing the members of the group55. It has been called cultural genocide when 
the goal of the acts is the destruction of a group by elimination of its cultural attributes, 







52 Lori Fisler Damrosch, Genocide and Ethnic Conflict, published in International Law and Ethnic 
Conflict edited by David Wippman, 1998, p.261 
53 Dinah L. Shelton (ed. in chief) Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, volume 1, 
p.396 
54 Lemkin; Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 1944, p.79 
55 The ICTY has confirmed that “to destroy” refers not only to the physical destruction of a group; see the 
Krstic-judgement, para.574  
56 Lemkin; Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 1944, p.79 
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political genocide; see above) was included in the first two drafts of the Genocide 
Convention, but removed from the final draft.57
 
3.2 Constituting genocide: Objective and subjective elements 
The crime of genocide is composed of three elements: Acts, intent and victim group. It 
is the questions regarding victim group that is the main issue in this thesis. Acts and 
intent will therefore only very briefly be discussed. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Genocide Convention and corresponding 
customary international rules require both objective and subjective elements in order to 
constitute genocide. The objective element’s two aspects; first, relating to the prohibited 
five acts and secondly the aspect of the objective element relating to the targeted group. 
The group has to be national, racial, ethnical or religious. The major issues regarding 
the objective side of genocide relate to the notion of the protected group of the crime 
and the identification of the four groups. Moreover, the subjective element (mens rea) 
must be materialized. To convict a person of genocide, the perpetrator must have the 
required intent. In its commentary on the 1996 Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission qualifies genocide’s special 
intent as “the distinguishing characteristics of this particular crime under international 
law”.58  The subjective element is also two-folded. First, the perpetrator must have 







57 Martin Mennecke and Eric Markusen; The international Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and the Crime of Genocide p. 301, I: Genocide, Caomparisons and Contemporary Debates. Danish 
Genocide Studies Series 2, 2003, Edited by Mette B. Jensen and Steven L. B. Jensen 
58 CF. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eight Session, 6 May-26 
July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, p.94 
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intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as such (dolus specialis).59 However, the 
question of intent falls outside the scope of this thesis and will therefore not be 
discussed in further detail. It is the objective element of genocide which will be 
discussed here and the main focus is on the “ethnic group”-requirement. 
 
3.3 The status of the Convention prior to the establishment of the ICTR 
regarding the protected groups 
Through the years scholars have regularly proposed amendments or tried to interpret the 
Genocide Convention in perhaps an unrealistic or exaggerated manner. In the end, 
however, the wording of the Convention has not been altered. During the 1970s and 
1980s it was questioned whether the Convention in fact was a historical curiosity. In 
1990 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn stated in The History and Sociology of Genocide. 
Analyses and Case studies, that the Genocide Convention “although it marked a 
milestone in international law, the UN definition is of little use to scholars”.  However, 
in the 1990s, after the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Rwanda, the Convention got 
its revival when the definition in the Genocide Convention was used in the statutes of 
both the ICTR (Art. 2) and ICTY (Art.7) as well as in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (the “ICC) Art.6. Thus, it seems clear that despite its shortcomings, the 
Convention remains the fundamental component of the current legal protection of 







59 Intent is a controversial element of the crime of genocide and is often discussed as a major limitation to 
successful prosecutions, cf. Dinah L. Shelton (ed. in chief) Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity, volume 1, p.396 
60 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, p.8, 2000 
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3.4 Generally on groups and categories – racial and ethnic groups, 
nationality 
There are different ways of categorizing different groups of human beings; e.g race, 
nationality and ethnicity. The habit of categorizing one self, as well as others, is deeply 
rooted in the human nature. It has even been claimed that categorization is a 
fundamental characteristic of our mental processes and probably can not be changed.61
  
Ethnicity can be based on different features linking people together. Those features can 
be a common language, religion, social rituals and a feeling of togetherness. The 
American scholar Donald L. Horowitzs states that a feeling of togetherness is a “strong 
sense of similarity, with roots in perceived genetic affinity or early socialization, or 
both”.62 The bond that members of an ethnic group share is often developed and 
intensified if there is a history of being victimized by other groups.63 The feeling of 
belonging to a certain group gets stronger if the group is stigmatised or harassed. This 
may be the case in Rwanda, where the Hutu through years felt discriminated against by 
the Tutsi elite. After the Hutu revolution in the late 1950s, it was the Tutsi that got the 
role as victims. A substantial number fled the country and the group as a whole felt 
targeted. The changing power conditions in Rwanda, where the two groups dominated 
in different periods, is likely to have developed the two groups’ feeling of togetherness 
and sharing a common fate and first and foremost making the ethnic awareness very 
clear. In a pre-genocidal period, there is a tendency among the potential perpetrators to 
refer to other human beings in terms of their group membership rather than as 







61 Afflitto, Frank M. and Vandiver, Margaret; The Political Determinants of Ethnic Genocide in Anatomy 
of Genocide (edited by Alexandre Kimenyi and Otis L. Scott)  
62 Horowitz, Donald L., The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p.47, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001  
63 Dinah L. Shelton (ed. in chief) Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, volume 1, 
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group being a threat to the perpetrators’ security or identity. This emotion has been 
labelled “negative ethos” which strengthens the sense of identity and “mutual belonging 
among ethnonationalist group members.”64 Such emotions are also used in order to 
emphasize and recall earlier oppression and persecution and creates an atmosphere of 
mistrust and hostility. This is an easy situation to exploit and misuse for political leaders 
to promote own agendas and policies.65
 
It has also been pointed out that the categories “race” and “nation” are not self-evident. 
They are not natural, timeless ways of understanding human variety and of organizing 
political and social systems. The term “race” originated in the late fourteenth century 
and was first used prevalently in the sixteenth century. Moreover, “nation” (from latin; 
natio) originally simply meant a group of people and was used to describe all kinds of 
groups (collectives).66 This may lead to a thought that “ethnic groups” are not self-
evident or timeless concepts.  
 
Members of an ethnic group typically share a sense of commonality. This sense of 
sharing features or attributes often have its beginning in a myth of common origins (e.g 
the Israelis as descendants from Abraham). It is reckoned that ethnicity is the most 
flexible and permeable form of identity. People belonging to other ethnic groups are 
normally able to assimilate into the ethnic group through marriage or acculturation. 
However, an ethnic group develops into a nation when it becomes politicised and a 








64 Rotchild, Donald and Groth, Alexander J.: Pathological dimensions of domestic and international 
ethnicity, Political Science Quarterly, 1995 110:69-82  
65 Afflitto, Frank M. and Vandiver, Margaret; The Political Determinants of Ethnic Genocide in Anatomy 
of Genocide (edited by Alexandre Kimenyi and Otis L. Scott) 
66 See Eric D. Weitz; A century of genocide, Princeton University Press 2003, p.17 
67 See Eric D. Weitz ; A century of genocide, 2003, p.21 
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Race is considered the most exclusive and closed category of identity.68 “Race” is 
defined as “each of the major divisions of humankind having distinct physical 
characteristics”69.  It has further been described as a category of individuals who are 
distinguished by common and constant, and therefore hereditary, features.70 This can be 
contrasted to ethnic groups which are more permeable (cf. above). In the US, the 
genocide legislation defines “racial group” as “a set of individuals whose identity as 
such is distinctive in terms of physical characteristics or biological descent”71. 
Moreover, it is held that distinguishing between “ethnical” and “racial” is rather 
difficult. It has been argued that the preferable solution is to take the two concepts 
together to cover relevant cases “rather than attempting to distinguish between the two 
so that unfortunate gaps appear.”72
 
However, a general discomfort with the term “race” and the associations it gives (cf. the 
theories and ideologies that grew out of the work of nineteenth century anthropologists 







68 See Eric D. Weitz ; A century of genocide, 2003, p.21 
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71 Cf. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 
72 Shaw, Malcolm; Genocide and International Law, in Yoram Dinstein (ed); International Law at a Time 
of perplexity (Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne), 1989:, p.807 
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4. Factual context 
 
4.1 Theories of Ethnicity in Rwanda - background and brief history 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Rwanda’s history is crucial to understand the relations between the different ethnic 
group and thus the reasons for the tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi. There have 
been many interpretations and theories concerning Rwanda’s complex history. The US 
historian Alison Des Forges claims that “beneath the individual motivations lay a 
common fear rooted in firmly held but mistaken ideas of the Rwandan past. Organizers 
of the genocide who had themselves grown up with these distortions of history, skilfully 
exploited misconceptions about who the Tutsi were, where they had come from, and 
what they had done in the past. From these elements, they fuelled the fear and hatred 
that made genocide imaginable”. 73
 
4.1.2 Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
There are about 8 million inhabitants in Rwanda. Out of these, 3% is Twa, 12% are 
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After the genocide Rwandans have in the reconciliation process tried to put the ethnic 
diversities behind them and official statistics on ethnicity does not exist.75  
 
The origin of ethnic identity in Rwanda remains a subject of major controversy. It 
seems to be widely accepted that the designations Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed in the 
pre-colonial Rwandan state (prior to 1895). However, the exact historic and 
demographic meanings of these designations have been disputed.76
 
One theory is that the forefathers of the Hutu and the Tutsi came to the Rwanda region 
over a period of two thousand years. A language, Kinyarwanda, and a common culture 
of song, dance and poetry were developed. A foundation of religious and philosophical 
ideas was also created.77 As Rwanda developed into a major state in the eighteenth 
century, people’s wealth was measured in the number of cattle. Steadily, an elite 
developed. The term “Tutsi” was first used describing a person who was rich in cattle. 
However, soon it became a term used to describe the elite group in general. On the other 
hand, “Hutu” was used to describe the mass of ordinary people. In this period, the terms 
“Hutu” and “Tutsi” referred to individuals rather than to groups. The distinction 
between the two groups was based on lineage rather that ethnicity. It was possible to 
move from one status to another through growth in wealth or through marriage.78
 
Another theory is that the hunting and gathering Twa were the first, and original, 
inhabitants of the territory. Then they were overrun and dominated by Hutu 







75 Sylo Taraku and Gunnar M. Karlsen (ed.); Report II/2002, The Norwegian Helsinki Committe  
76 Dinah L. Shelton (ed. in chief) Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, volume 2, 
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region from the western regions of Africa approximately two thousand years ago. Tutsi 
cattle herders are alleged to have conquered the territory about five hundred years ago. 
The theory holds that the Tutsi, despite their inferior numbers, soon established 
authority over the Hutu and the Twa. Thus, the hatred that generated the genocide was a 
consequence of the resentment that was created by the Tutsi occupation and subjugation 
in this period. This theory dominated the view on Rwanda’s history for many decades, 
but has today been discredited by most scholars.79
 
However, in recent research, two other theories have dominated. Both theories maintain 
that ethnicity is a social construction that is fluid and that determination of ethnicity can 
not be based on physical characteristics. However, the two theories have different views 
on the question on what time ethnicity in Rwanda got its modern form. One theory is 
that in pre-colonial Rwanda, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were categories that derived from 
work related activity and had actually small social significance, as the groups shared a 
common language, culture and lived together throughout the country. Then, colonial 
policies subsequently transformed these categories into ethnic groups. This theory is 
supported by some scholars and many current Rwandan politicians.80
 
The supporters of the second theory argue that the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa conferred 
status and were freighted with status difference even before the colonial period. In the 
mid 1800s the central court of Rwanda (which was then a monarchy) used 
categorization of the population in order to extend its control. Tutsi were placed in 
marginal areas as the court’s representatives. Furthermore, the supporters of this theory 
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period was accelerated in the colonial period. The colonists transformed the inhabitants’ 
group identity by introducing Western ideas and ideology regarding race and 
discrimination based on ethnicity. This lead to increased focus and consciousness 
regarding identity. The interpretations ultimately influenced how Rwandans saw 
themselves and understood their group identity.81   
 
Others have again claimed that the Tutsi are descendants of Nilotic herders, whereas the 
Hutu are believed to be of “Bantu” origin from south and central Africa.82 However, this 
is not indisputable and there are several theories regarding especially the origin of the 
Tutsi. For example has it been claimed that the Tutsi originated from Ethiopia, while the 
researcher Christophe Mfizi in Les lignes de faite du Rwanda independent  argues that 
the Tutsi are descendants of  Semitic people who migrated from Saudi Arabia. Another 
researcher, Paul del Perugia in Les derniers rois mages claims that the origin of the 
Tutsi is the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt.83 However, it has also been claimed that as 
people married within the occupational group they belonged to (The Hutu were 
normally cultivators, while the Tutsi were pastoralists), a shared gene pool was created 
and thus made the two groups reinforce and carry on the physical differences.84
 
4.2 Recent history 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Rwanda was colonized by Germany from 1897 and Belgium from 1917. The colonizers 
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Tutsi. In the beginning of the 1930s Belgian authorities established a system of identity 
cards based on what the Belgians considered as three distinct ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa. It became mandatory to carry this card.85 The system with identity cards was 
maintained until 1994. In addition to the system of identity cards, the Belgian colonial 
administration decided that one’s identity followed the identity of one’s father. This 
effectively eliminated the earlier fluid nature of ethnic identities.86 It has been claimed 
that by giving the Tutsi group power and positions and making them the superior group, 
the colonizers thus arranged for a future conflict. In the view of the colonizers, the Tutsi 
looked more European with their height and light colour and therefore automatically 
more intelligent and more able to govern. Alison Desforges writes: “Unclear whether 
these were races, tribes, or language groups, the Europeans were nonetheless certain 
that the Tutsi were superior to the Hutu and the Hutu superior to the Twa – just as they 
knew themselves superior to all three”.87  
 
Regarding the physical differences between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, it is clear that the Twa  
people (about 1% of the population) always has differentiated from the Hutu and Tutsi. 
First, they are physically distinguishable by such features as their smaller size and 
secondly they also used to speak a distinctive form of Kinyarwanda.88  
 
The “typical” Tutsi would be tall, slender and narrow-featured, while the Hutu will be 
shorter and with broader features. Those features are visible in some, but not in many 
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become more difficult to know a person’s group affiliation simply by looking at the 
person. 
 
The theory on ancient ethnic hatred has been widely criticised. It is often claimed that 
the Tutsi and Hutu “labels” initially only was a question of social status. The fact that 
intermarriage was very common and that the two groups lived peacefully as neighbours, 
there were no Hutuland or Tutsiland, has been used as arguments for there being no 
ancient deep rooted ethnic conflict between the two groups. Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that Rwanda was a stable country where people were dispersed on 
thousands of hills.89
 
4.2.2 The Hutu revolution  
The Tutsi were favoured by the Belgian colonizers in terms of education, positions in 
public life and government services. Occupational and educational opportunities were 
reserved for the Tutsi. However, the Hutu population became increasingly impoverished 
and embittered. Then, as the Belgians were under pressure from the UN, gradually the 
Hutu to a certain extent were allowed to participate in public life. In 1956 free elections 
were held and the Hutu obtained a clear majority. A confrontation between the two 
groups became inevitable and in 1959 political unrest broke out. After a period of 
violence it ended in October 1960 with the establishment of an autonomous provisional 
Government headed by the Hutu grass root party; MDR Parmehutu. The Tutsi monarch 
fled and Rwanda became a republic in 1961. The following year independence was 
declared. Events from 1959 to 1962 have later been described as ethnic cleansings. 
Massacres of Tutsi took place and Tutsi in the northern part of Rwanda, in Ruhengeri 
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slaughtered. They were then resettled in less attractive areas in Bugeresera and Sake in 
Kibungo.90 These events led to the rapid departure of Tutsis to exile in neighbouring 
countries (e.g. Uganda). During the 1960s some of these refugees made several attempts 
to attack Rwanda. After the attacks severe reprisals aimed at Tutsis still living in 
Rwanda were carried out. It is estimated that about 20.000 Tutsi were killed and more 
than 300.000 fled abroad in this period.91 The Hutu revolution is of major significance 
in order to understand the genocide following more than 30 years later. Some theories 
claim that there is often a close relation between revolution and genocide. The 
American genocide scholar Robert Melson argues for such a theory and states: “Some 
revolutions may lead to genocide because all revolutions redefine and recast the 
political community, and in the process they exclude certain communal groups and 
classes. It is this exclusion that becomes the necessary condition for genocide, and in 
that sense revolutions, especially those that lead to war, can provide the circumstances 
under which necessary conditions for genocide are established.”92  
 
After the Hutu revolution, the Tutsi were excluded from the political community and 
important posts in the country. Furthermore, the identification of the Tutsi as enemies 
both within Rwanda and abroad, made them an ideal target. In a country where the Tutsi 
traditionally were on top of the social pyramid, while the Hutu were of lower class, 
Rwanda was very susceptible to revolution. Another aspect is that the Tutsi population 
in Rwanda was seen as potential allies of the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) 
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For several years the southern-based MDR Parmehutu leaders neglected Hutu from the 
north and in 1973 this split was clear and the disagreements within the regime resulted 
in anarchy. In July 1973, General Juvènal Habyarimana took power through a coup, 
established a second republic and in 1975 made Rwanda a single-party state under the 
Mouvement rèvolutionnare national pour le dèveloppement (MRND).93  
 
4.2.3 The Habyarimana period 
Initially, many Tutsi were positive to Habyarimana and were prepared to reach a 
compromise. However, gradually, Habyarimana’s politics became clearly anti-Tutsi and 
the Tutsi was widely discriminated, for instance by applying quota systems in 
universities and government services. Thus, after a promising start of the Habyarimana 
period, the situation in Rwanda deteriorated. A policy of systematic discrimination was 
pursued even among the Hutu (in the favour of Hutu people from Habyarimana’s native 
regions; Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). It has been underlined how this discrimination against 
the Hutu seriously weakened Habyarimana and how it led to opposition and internal 
unrest amongst the Hutu. In addition, president Habyarimana was confronted with a 
dramatic economic decline and foreign donors were demanding political reforms. Thus, 
Habyarimana had to accept the multi-party system in principle. The new constitution 
introducing the multi-party system was adopted in June 1991.94
 
4.2.4 The attack on 1 October 1990 
In 1990 the number of Rwandans in exile was approximately 600.000. Amongst those 
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home to Rwanda by their own means. The RPF did not want only the return of the 
refugees, but also another and more democratic government. 
 
On 1 October 1990 the RPA (the fighting force of the RPF) crossed the boarder from 
western Uganda with Paul Kagame in command.95 The Tutsi refugee warriors had 
massive military and logistical support from Uganda.96 For President Habyarimana, the 
attack was an opportunity to rebuild the power he was about to lose by uniting Rwanda 
against the enemy. However, he understood that it was a risk as well. The attack might 
embolden the opposition of Rwanda and lead them into alliance with the enemy. 
Furthermore the invasion represented a serious threat to the restoring of the dignity of 
the Hutu masses after the 1959-62 revolution. In addition, it made the resident Tutsi 
population potential enemies as the prospect of another period of Tutsi domination 
suddenly became more likely. Moreover, the invasion unleashed the rage of scores of 
Hutu politicians against Tutsi communities as well as strengthening the Hutu solidarity.  
 
The 1 October RPF attack was easily quelled by Habyarimana troops, with the support 
of Zaire, Belgium and France. However, Habyarimana used the invasion to retake the 
political lead (cf. above). On 4 October 1994, the Habyarimana regime launched a fake 
attack on Kigali. It was supposed to be understood as an RPF attack. The bogus attack 
was used in order to justify the arrest of hundreds of Tutsi and moderate Hutu under the 
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This new atmosphere served to worse the atmosphere of ethnic tensions in the country 
and lead to recurrent cycles of genocidal massacres against the Tutsi (against the 
Bagogwe, a Tutsi subgroup and the Bugesera Tutsi in March 1992).98   
 
Over the next years, Habyarimana used a two-pronged strategy to keep the political 
control. First, they appeased critics by entering negotiations with the RPF. There was 
also made political concessions; as political reforms (e.g. legalizing opposition parties). 
However, on the other hand, the Habyarimana regime actively undermined these 
concessions by for example denying the opposition any real power. In this period the 
country faced economic decline, increased unemployment and growing violence. 
During this period, Habyarimana’s supporters increased their coercive power through a 
massive expansion of the Rwandan Armed Forces (the FAR).99  In 1993 it is supposed 
that a powerful circle of Hutu (known as akazu) close to Habyarimana, planned how to 
eliminate both Tutsi and moderate Hutu in order to regain broad political control via 
large-scale massacres. The akazu, which mainly consisted of Hutu from Habyarimana’s 
home region Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, felt increasingly threatened by political reforms 
and the ongoing negotiations with RPF.  
 
In August 1993 the Rwandan Government and the RPF signed the final Arusha 
Accords, the final power-sharing peace agreement between the Habyarimana regime 
and the RPF. The agreement was widely perceived in Rwanda as having ceded too 
much to the RPF and having solidified the division of political parties into pro- and anti-
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and the extreme anti-Tutsi party, the CDR, in a loose pro-regime coalition. This 
coalition was named “Hutu Power”. The Hutu Power fraction saw themselves as natural 
rulers as they constituted Rwanda’s majority and because the Hutu had a long history in 
Rwanda (as opposed to the Tutsi who had arrived at a later stage to conquer and 
dominate the country). It was drawn a picture of all Tutsis to be RPF sympathizers and 
that moderate Hutus, who supported the Arusha Accords or opposed Habyarimana were 
traitors or secretly Tutsi. The Tèlèvision Libre Mille-Collines was established; a new 
radio station which broadcasted Hutu Power’s anti-Tutsi, anti-opposition and anti-
Arusha Accords propaganda.100
 
Burundi’s president was assassinated in October 1993. This event had great impact on 
neighbouring Rwanda. The Hutu Power movement claimed that the failure of a 
transition to majority rule in Burundi showed that the Tutsi were not trustworthy. After 
the assassination, a wave of inter-ethnic violence took place in Burundi and led to a 
stream of Hutu-refugees into Rwanda. This further tensioned the political climate. At 
the same time, Rwandan military personnel began to provide paramilitary training for 
the youth wings of Hutu Power, such as Intrahamwe (the MRND’s youth group).101
 
In the beginning of 1994, political and ethnic tensions continued to increase, and despite 
the Arusha Accords being implemented, Hutu Power forces sought to scuttle the final 
transfer of power to a new unity government. Meanwhile, UN forces (the United 
Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda – UNAMIR) were stationed in Rwanda to 
oversee the transition. However, the FAR (the Armed Forces of Rwanda) continued to 
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assassinations took place and they intensified the atmosphere of crisis in the country. At 
this time, intelligence reports warned that ethnic and political massacres would 
inevitably take place in Rwanda. Furthermore the commander of the UNIMAR forces, 
General Romèo Dallaire, sent a memo to the UN headquarters that he had been 
informed of the Hutu extremists plan to carry out genocide. None of these warnings 
were followed up.102
4.2.5 6 April 1994 
On 6 April 1994, the airplane carrying President Habyarimana and the president of 
Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down by surface-to-air missiles as it prepared to 
land at Kigali. All onboard died in the crash. Still today it is not clear who was 
responsible for the attack. The shooting down seemed like a signal. Immediately after 
the plane crash, military and militia groups began rounding up Tutsi as well as moderate 
Hutu and started killings and massacres. The genocide had begun. The killings started in 
Kigali, but soon spread to all corners of Rwanda. Between 6 April and the beginning of 
June about 800.000 people were killed in what emerged as one of history’s most 
effective genocides. 
5. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss the case law of the ICTR (and some ICTY case law, cf. 
5.4.1) regarding the definition and scope of the protected groups. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the analysis will mainly focus on “ethnic group” as this is the central 
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I will seek to identify which factors made the ICTR identifying the Tutsi as an ethnic 
group and which factors that the Tribunal did not find determining. Furthermore, I will 
analyse the case law of the ICTR in order to establish the scope of the protected groups 
and how the Tribunal has developed the law at this point. Thus, I will try to find some 
general elements which are relevant for the interpretation of the protected groups. 
 
Rwanda is a clear example of how complicated the application of the four concepts of 
the protected groups can be. In Rwanda’s case, the identification of a protected group 
has been a major issue in the aftermaths of 1994.103
 
5.2 Analysis of relevant cases in the ICTR case law 
5.2.1 What is an ethnic group?  
The question is which distinguishing characteristics that have to be present in order to 
define one group as ethnic. In this respect, when analysing the ICTR case law, the 
starting point will be the Akayesu-case, as this is the ICTR’s first judgement and thus 
made precedence. 
 
In the Akayesu-case the ICTR Trial Chamber found the question of whether the Tutsi 
constituted an ethnic group complicated. As a starting point, the Trial Chamber defined 
an ethnic group as “a group whose members share a common language or culture.”104 
As the Tutsi had the same language, religion and by far the same culture as the Hutu, it 
was not evident that the Tutsi in fact was a separate ethnic group. Furthermore, the Trial 
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are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with 
reciprocity of rights and duties“105 and a religious group as “one whose members share 
the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.” The Tribunal found that ethnic 
came closest despite there being few meaningful ways of distinguishing in terms of 
language and culture from the Hutu.106  
 
In the Kayishema and Ruzindana-case the Trial Chamber stated that “an ethnic group is 
one whose members share a common language and culture; or, a group which 
distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such by others, 
including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others).”107
 
Characteristics like language, religion and culture would be easily recognised. When 
those characteristics were not present, i.e when it was not possible to point out a group 
based on these specific characteristics, the ICTR had to investigate and discuss whether 
there were other means of identifying the Tutsi as a protected group. 
 
The Trial Chamber in the Akayesu-case acknowledged the fact that the Tutsi population 
did not have “its own language or a distinct culture from the rest of the Rwanda 
population.”108 However, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that a number of objective 
factors indicated that the Tutsi nevertheless was an ethnic group. The Trial Chamber 
concluded on the basis of witness testimony and official classifications that the “the 
Tutsi constituted a group referred to as ethnic” and furthermore it found that the Tutsi 
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In the following I will look at the factors which the Trial Chamber in Akayesu used in 
order to define the Tutsi as an ethnic group. 
 
5.2.2 The factors – establishing the Tutsi as a protected group  
5.2.2.1 Identity cards and official classifications 
Based on, amongst other factors, the existence of government-issued official identity 
cards describing them as such, the Trial Chamber held that the Tutsi were an ethnic 
group. The Trial Chamber found that the Tutsi constituted a group which was referred 
to as “ethnic” in official classifications.110 In the identity cards it was referred to the 
Kinyarwandan word “ubwko” or the French word “ethnie” which means ethnic group. 
Moreover, the Constitution of Rwanda and the laws in force in 1994 identified all 
inhabitants of Rwanda by referring to their ethnic group. Art. 57 of the Constitution of 
the Rwandan Republic of 10 June 1991 provided that every Rwanda should be 
identified by “sex, ethnic group, name, residence and domicile”. Furthermore, the Art. 
118 of the Civil Code of 1988 required that birth certificates had to include “the year, 
month, date and place of birth, the sex, the ethnic group, the first and the last name of 
the infant.”111
 
5.2.2.2 Tutsi separated from Hutu at roadblocks 
The ICTR Trial Chamber held that the fact that at roadblocks all over Rwanda after 6 
April 1994, the Tutsi were separated from the Hutu and killed,112 does imply that the 







110 Ibid, para.702 
111 Ibid,para.170 
112 Ibid, para.123 
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whether the person was Tutsi or Hutu, of every passing person was checked by troops 
of the Presidential Guard or members of the Intrahamwe. After checking the ethnicity 
on the identity cards, the Tutsi were separated from the Hutu and killed, sometimes on 
the spot.113
 
5.2.2.3 Evidence of propaganda campaign 
The Trial Chamber in the Akayesu-case found that the propaganda campaign conducted 
before and during the genocide by the audiovisual and print media, e.g, “Radio 
Television des Milles Collines”(RTLM) and the Kangura newspaper, supported the 
identification of the Tutsi as an ethnic group. These different news media encouraged 
killing of Tutsi who they reckoned as allies of the RPF. The Trial Chamber held that 
certain newspaper articles and cartoons printed in the Kangura newspaper were 
“unambiguous in this respect.”114
 
5.2.2.4   Tutsi bodies thrown in the Nile 
Witnesses testified in the Akayesu-case that Tutsi bodies were systematically thrown 
into the Nyabarongo river, which is a tributary of the Nile. The US historian Alison 
Desforges testified that the underlying intention of throwing the bodies into the Nile 
was to “send the Tutsi back to their place of origin.”115 This was done to underline that 









113 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 2 September 1998, para.123 
114 Ibid, para.123 
115 Ibid, para.120 
116 Ibid, para.120 
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5.2.2.5 Self-identification 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber noted that during the Akayesu-trial all the Rwandan 
witnesses spontaneously and without hesitation answered when questioned about their 
ethnic identity.117 In the Chamber’s opinion this showed that the Tutsi did constitute a 
stable and permanent group which was regarded as such a group by all Rwandans.118
 
5.2.2.6 General observations and conclusions regarding the decisive factors  
 
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu concludes that “the Tutsi population does not have its 
own language or a distinct culture from the rest of the Rwandan population. However, 
the Chamber finds that there are a number of objective indicators of the group as a 
group with a distinct identity”.119 Thus, despite that the Trial Chamber was fully aware 
of that the Tutsi did not have a separate language or a distinct culture or met the general 
definition of an ethnic group, i.e. members who speak the same language and/or have 
the same culture, it reached the conclusion that the Tutsi constituted an ethnic group 
based on other elements (listed above). In short, the Trial Chamber found the two 
groups distinctive based on a) the distinction made by the Belgian colonizers by the 
establishment of a system of identity cards, and b) the distinction was confirmed by the 
self-perception of the members of each of the groups.   
 
Another thing to be noted is that the Trial Chamber in Aakayesu does not focus on 
physical differences. Cf. Chapter 4.11 (factual context) were it is held that physical 







117 Ibid, para.702 
118 Ibid, para.702 
119 Ibid, para.170 
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others. Moreover, common distinguishing elements as culture, language and religion 
was not useable as these were shared by the Hutu and the Tutsi population.  
 
The ICTR’s use of the listed factors shows that the Tribunal emphasizes how the 
protected group is perceived by the perpetrator together with some objective elements. 
Thus the constitution of a protected group has a high degree of subjectivity. The 
objective criteria are thus supplemented by a subjective standard of perception and self-
perception. It seems that the determination a whether a group is a protected group has 
developed from an objective to a more subjective standard.120 Consequently, an 
objective test establishing distinctive features like language, religion etc is in many 
cases alone not sufficient.  
 
It has been asked why the ICTR did not find the Tutsi as constituting a racial group. A 
general discomfort with the use of the “race”-category may explain why they did not opt 
for that. As earlier explained, the general conception of the Tutsi group within Rwanda 
is based on hereditary physical features, even though these are often not very obvious in 
many people. In the Akayesu-case121 the ICTR stated that the conventional definition of 
a racial group is based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a 
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.122 







120 Cf. Schabas, p.109 and Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, Section II, para.11 
121 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998 
122 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 513 and Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, para. 98 
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Convention Art. II is “larger” than the racial group and refers to a “community of people 
bound together by the same customs, the same language and the same race”123
 
5.2.2.7 Subsequent ICTR jurisprudence 
Later ICTR case law has followed up the Akayesu- line regarding the ethnic group-
issue. In the Ntakirutimana-case,124 the ICTR Trial Chamber built their conclusion on 
whether the Tutsi constituted an ethnic group on the totality of the evidence heard in the 
case. When discussing whether the accused had the requisite intent to commit genocide, 
the Chamber held that the Tutsi were an ethnic group. 
 
In the Kayishema and Ruzindana-case, the ICTR Trial Chamber concludes that the 
Tutsi constitutes an ethnic group; “The victims of this tragedy were Tutsi civilians 
which leaves this Chamber satisfied that the targets of the massacres were ‘members of 
a group,’ in this case an ethnic group”125
 
Moreover, in the Semanza-case, the ICTR Trial Chamber held that the Tutsi was an 
ethnic group and took judicial notice of the fact that “between 6 April 1994 and 17 July 
1994, citizens native to Rwanda were severally identified according to the following 
ethnic classifications: Tutsi, Hutu and Twa”. Accordingly, it has been established for 








123 Glaser, Stèfan, in Benjamin Whitaker; Revised and Updated report on the Question of the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York, United Nations (Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, p.15-
16 
124 Prosecutor v.Elizaphan and Gèrard Ntakirutimana, Case No, ICTR-96-10 ICTR-96-17-T, Judgement 
of 21 February 2003, para.789 
125 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, para.291 
126 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement of 15 May 2003, para.422 
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5.2.3 The scope of Art. II 
5.2.3.1 The “stable and permanent”-theory 
The Trial Chamber in the Akayesu-case seemed to find the enumeration of protected 
groups in Art.II of the Convention to be too narrow and opted for an interpretative 
expansion of Art.II. The Trial Chamber defined a “group” and stated that the provisions 
on genocide only refer to what they call “stable groups”.127
 
The Trial Chamber further discussed whether groups which are stable and permanent 
like the four included groups, but still does not meet the definition at any one of the four 
groups expressly protected by the Convention, also should be included. That is; would it 
be possible to punish the physical destruction of such a group (e.g none of the four 
groups listed in Art.II) under the Genocide Convention? In this obiter dictum the Trial 
Chamber held that in a situation where none of the four concepts would fit, it is still 
possible to extend to certain other groups. However, the Trial Chamber did not 
elaborate further on which groups that may possibly fall within the scope of the 
genocide definition.128 The Trial Chamber here stressed the particular importance of 
respecting the intention of the drafters of the Convention and refers to the preparatory 
work of the Convention. Thus, it appears that any group regardless of whether it is 
considered as an ethnic, racial, religious or national group in an ordinary accepted 









127 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 2 September 1998, para.511 
128 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 2 September 1998, para.516, see also 
Genocide in International Law, William A. Schabas, 2000, p.131  
129 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 2 September 1998, para.516 
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The Trial Chamber refers to the records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly in 1948130 where it, in the Trial Chamber’s view, appears that 
genocide was perceived as targeting only “stable” groups. Further, the Trial Chamber 
finds that these are groups that are constituted in a permanent fashion and membership 
which is determined by birth. More mobile groups which can be voluntary joined (e.g. 
political and economic groups) were excluded. Thus, the Trial Chamber concludes that 
a common criterion for all the four protected groups is that membership in such groups 
is normally not challengeable by its members who automatically by birth belong to it in 
a “continuous and often irremediable manner”.131
 
In the second major ICTR judgement, the Kayishema and Ruzindana-case,132 the Trial 
Chamber (another trial chamber than in the Aakyesu-case) adopted a different approach 
to the above discussed issue. The Trial Chamber determines that the Tutsi constitute an 
ethnic group and apparently, the Trial Chamber failed to support the “stable and 
permanent”-theory from the Akayesu-judgement.133  
 
In the Musema-judgement from January 2000 the same Trial Chamber (Trial Chamber 
1, in both cases consisting of judges Lennart Aspegren, Navanethem Pillay and Laïty 
Kama) as in the Akayesu-judgement returned to the “stable and permanent”-thesis. 
Again, the judges refer to the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention134 and 
holds that “certain groups, such as political and economic groups, have been excluded 
from the protected groups, because they are considered to be “non stable” or “mobile” 







130 Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21 September - 
10 December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly 
131 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 2 September 1998, para.511 
132 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999,para 
133 See William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law, 2000, p.132 
134 Cf. Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21 September 
- 10 December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly. 
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suggest a contrario that the Convention was presumably intended to cover relatively 
stable and permanent groups.”135
 
Then the Trial Chamber concludes that when assessing whether a group is protected or 
not, there has to be carried out on a case-to-case basis taking into account “the specific 
political, social and cultural context in which the acts allegedly took place.”136
 
5.2.3.2 Group membership – an objective or subjective approach 
As a solution to the difficulties regarding the interpretation of the four categories in Art. 
II of the Convention, some scholars have argued for a subjective approach. That implies 
that if the offender views the group as being national, racial, ethnical or religious then 
that should suffice. As earlier mentioned, the Trial Chamber in the Akayesu-judgement 
operated with both objective and subjective criteria when establishing whether or not a 
group of persons was actually a group that was protected by the Convention. Here the 
Trial Chamber both asked how those persons were in fact treated and how they saw 
themselves. However, the idea of a subjective element regarding group membership was 
not invented at the ICTR. In 1990, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn defined genocide as 
“a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy 
a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”137
Another, and clearer, case law example of this view can be found in the Kayishema and 







135 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement of  27 January 2000, para.160 
136 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement of  27 January 2000, para.160 
137 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn; The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, 
1990 
138 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999,para.98 
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stated that an ethnic group could be “a group identified as such by others, including 
perpetrators of the crimes.”139
 
The subjective approach was further developed in the Rutaganda-case.140  Here the 
ICTR Trial Chamber chose a clear subjective approach. The Trial Chamber first states 
that the concepts of the four protected groups in Art. II have been widely researched and 
that, at the time of the judgement, were “no generally and internationally accepted 
precise definitions thereof.”141 The Trial Chamber proceeds with underlining that such a 
definition of the concepts must be assessed in the light of the particular political, social 
and cultural context. Then the Trial Chamber concludes that for the purposes of 
applying the Genocide Convention, membership of a group is in fact a subjective rather 
than an objective concept. The Trial Chamber states moreover that the victim is 
perceived by the perpetrator as a member of a protected group. In some instances, the 
victim may perceive himself/herself as belonging to the protected group.  
 
In the Musema-case, the ICTR Trial Chamber noted that the concepts of national, 
ethnical, racial and religious groups have been researched extensively and, at present, 
there exist no generally and internationally accepted precise definitions. Furthermore, it 
was concluded that each of the concepts “must be assessed in the light of a particular 
political, social and cultural context.” 142  Then the Trial Chamber states that regarding 
the application of the Genocide Convention, the membership of a group is, in essence, 
rather subjective, rather than objective concept. The Trial Chamber points out that the 







139 See William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law, 2000, p.110 
140 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgement of 6 December 1999. Georges Rutaganda 
was a businessman & 2nd V.P. of Interahamwe. He was found guilty of genocide and crimes against 
humanity. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and his appeal was dismissed on 26 May 2003.
141 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgement of 6 December 1999, para.56 
142 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement of  27 January 2000, para.163 
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In some cases, the Trial Chamber states, the victim will consider himself to be a 
member of the specific group. Then the Trial Chamber continues by concluding that a 
subjective definition is alone not sufficient to determine a victim group, and the judges 
refer to the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention,143 pointing out the distinction 
between stable and non-stable (mobile) groups.144 Furthermore, it states that “therefore, 
the Chamber holds that in assessing whether a particular group may be considered 
protected from the crime of genocide, it will proceed on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account both the relevant evidence proffered and the specific political, social and 
cultural context in which the acts allegedly took place.” 
 
In the Semanza- case145, the ICTR Trial Chamber first states that the ICTR Statute does 
not give any information regarding whether the targeted group is to be determined by 
objective or subjective criteria or by what they call “some hybrid formulation”.146 Then 
the Trial Chamber proceeds by pointing out that the ICTR Trial Chambers have found 
that the determination of whether a group is within the scope of Art. 2 of the Statute 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis; “by reference to the objective particulars of 
a given social or historical context, and by the subjective perceptions of the 
perpetrators”147. Thus, the Chamber concludes that the determination of a protected 
group must be made on a case-by-case basis, where both objective and subjective 








143 Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21 September - 10 
December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly. 
144 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement of 27 January 2000. Alfred Musema, 
Director of a Tea Factory in Gisovu. The ICTR found him guilty of genocide and crimes against 
humanity and sentenced him to life imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed on 16 November 2001 and 
he now serves his sentence in Mali. 
145 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement of 15 May 2003. Laurent Semanza, the 
Bourgmestre of Bicumbi, was by the ICTR found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity. He hot 
a 25 years sentence. His case is currently on appeal. 
146 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement of 15 May 2003, para.317 
147 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement of 15 May 2003, para.317  
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In the Bagilishema-case148, where the accused was acquitted, the Trial Chamber first 
noted that the concepts of national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups does not have 
any generally or internationally accepted definition (cf. the above mentioned Semanza-
case). Therefore, the Chamber concludes that each concept must be assessed in the 
actual political, historical, social and cultural context. The Chamber further recognizes 
that in the assessment both the subjective and objective dimension is central; “A group 
may not have precisely defined boundaries and there may be occasions when it is 
difficult to give a definitive answer as to whether or not a victim was a member of a 
protected group. Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide may characterize the targeted 
group in ways that do not fully correspond to conceptions of the group shared 
generally, or by other segments of society. In such a case, the Chamber is of the opinion 
that, on the evidence, if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a 
protected group, the victim could be considered by the Chamber as a member of the 
protected group, for the purposes of genocide.”149
 
In a recent judgement, the Ndindabahizi-case, the Trial Chamber refers to the 
Bagilishema-judgement, and the above quotation when it assesses the question of 
whether a person belonged to a protected group. It concludes that the subjective 
intentions of the perpetrators are of “primary importance.”150
 
5.3 Discussion 
5.3.1 Criticism of the “stable and permanent”-theory 
The “stable and permanent”-theory has been criticized and widely debated. It has been 







148 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgement of 7 June 2001 
149 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgement of 7 June 2001, para.65 
150 Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgement of 15 July 2004, para.468 
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Convention clearly expressed the intention to protect the groups set out in Art. II.151 If 
the Genocide Convention framers actually meant to include all “stable and permanent” 
groups why did they not simply say that? Further, it has been pointed out that the Trial 
Chambers’ way of using the Convention’s preparatory work is actually wrong. The 
preparatory work may clarify unclear and ambiguous terms or terms which are absurd 
or unreasonable.152 On the other hand, it is not the purpose to add elements that where 
actually left out at the preparatory stage. Moreover, including terms that are not already 
present in the legal text, is particularly dubious when it regards treaties/legal texts that 
define criminal offences. In the field of criminal law, the interpretation is normally 
supposed to be restrictive in order to avoid conflict with the fundamental principle 
nullum crimen sine lege.153 It has been claimed that if the hypothesis based on the 
principle of “stable and permanent” is to be sustained, it must rely on the actual wording 
of Art.II.154
 
Moreover, it has been pointed out that three of the four groups included in Art.II are in 
fact neither stable nor permanent. It has been claimed that only racial groups are 
actually relatively stable as they are defined genetically. It is a human right to change 
both nation and religion.155 Further, people belonging to different ethnic groups are 
normally able to assimilate into another ethnic group through marriage or acculturation 









151 Cf. International Criminal Law, Antonio Cassese, 2003, p.101 
152 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1979) 1155 UNTS 331,art.32 
153 William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law, 2000, p.132 cf. Prosecutor v. Delalic et al, Case 
No. IT -96-21-T, Judgement 16 November 1998, para.166 
154 William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law , 2000, p.133 
155 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810, arts.15(1) and 18 
156 William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law , 2000, p.133 
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Scholars have also claimed that the Genocide Convention’s preparatory work actually 
does not clearly show that the aim was to, in ICTR’s words: “patently to ensure the 
protection of any stable and permanent group”157.  They stress the fact that the 
principle of “stable and permanent” groups was only referred to a few times during the 
drafting and that other alternatives were discussed as well.158 Another point is that 
political groups, groups which are in themselves unstable, was initially included 
amongst the protected groups, but removed in the last minute. This might show that the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention were perhaps in fact not very clear and steady 
regarding “stable and permanent groups”.159
 
In my view, the “stable and permanent”-theory introduced in the Akayesu-case, is both 
broadening and narrowing at the same time. Broadening, in the sense that the Trial 
Chamber found other means of including groups of human beings as a protected group 
despite it was found not being included in one of the four protected groups in Art. II. 
This was done by referring to the preparatory work and concluding that there still was 
hope if the group could be classified as “stable and permanent”. On the other hand, I 
find the theory narrowing, in the sense that in fact very few groups are completely stable 
and permanent. And how practical is it to determine stability and permanency? Perhaps 
could the Chamber in Akayesu have followed the advice of Judges Guerrero, McNair 
and Mo who in their advisory opinion160 argued for a generous and flexible 
interpretation in genocide-cases. The use of this approach in the interpretation of human 









157 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 2 September 1998, para.516 
158 William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law , 2000, p.133, cf. UN Doc.A/C.6/SR.69 
159 William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law , 2000, p.133 
160 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion), International Court of Justice, 28 May 1951, p.30 
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Finally, it has been argued that the “stable and permanent”-theory has not been 
supported when the crime of genocide has been introduced in national penal codes. This 
lack of support in national legislation may imply that the hypothesis of “stable and 
permanent” groups is not universally accepted. As states have used other variants of the 
definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, no one has, so far, opted for the 
“stable and permanent” approach.161  
 
 
5.3.2 Views on interpretation 
One question which can be asked is whether the Tribunal’s reliance on the preparatory 
work of the Genocide Convention will freeze the interpretation of the Convention and 
thus preventing it from a natural development. Critically, one can ask what value the 
debates of 1947 and 1948 actually have. It is often argued that the interpretation of 
international rules is based on the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat). The principle implies that such rules are to be given maximum effect. Thus, as 
genocide is perhaps the gravest international crime, it is argued that rules concerning 
genocide must be construed in such a manner as to give them maximum legal effect.162
 
Human Rights Tribunals do in many cases have a dynamic approach to interpretation 
due to the special character of human rights law. For instance, it is a principle of a 
dynamic and evolutive interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights163 
due to this convention’s goal to give an effective protection of the fundamental human 







161 William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law, 2000, p.133 
162 Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, Section II, para.6. Available at 
www.ohchr.org/english/darfur.htm 
163 Rome, 4 XI, 1950 
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conditions as “a living instrument.”164 Supporting this view, judge Alvarez in a 
dissenting judgement in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice165 
warned of the dangers of excessive reference to the preparatory work of the the 
Genocide Convention. He argued that conventions like the Genocide Convention have 
“acquired a life of their own”. Further, he stated that “They can be compared to ships 
which leave the yards in which they have been built, and sail away independently, no 
longer attached to the past, and only with regard to the future”.166
 
The principle of dynamic interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
may be transferred to the Genocide Convention, as both conventions are supposed to 
protect vital human interests. Because of the Genocide Convention’s nature as a human 
rights or humanitarian law treaty, other principles of interpretation are also said to apply 
to the Genocide Convention. In a joint dissenting opinion in the above mentioned 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice167, Judges Guerrero, McNair and 
Mo stated that “The enormity of the crime of genocide can hardly be exaggerated, and 
any treaty for its repression deserves the most generous interpretation.”168
 
On the other hand, a “generous” interpretation may not be suitable in criminal law. In 
the area of international criminal law there is a principle of individual criminal 
responsibility. The principle of a flexible and “generous” interpretation may come in 
conflict with other major and fundamental principles. The principles nullum crimen sine 







164 Tyrer v.UK,,The European Court of Human Rights,  A 26 (1978) cf. Erik Møse, Menneskerettigheter, 
Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 2002, pp.101-102 
165 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion), International Court of Justice, 28 May 1951. The text is available at 
http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/docs/genocide%20convention%20decision.pdf 
166 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion), International Court of Justice, 28 May 1951, p.30. See footnote 122 for web address. 
167 See footnote 122 
168 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion), International Court of Justice, 28 May 1951, p.26  
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systems as being fundamental principles of criminality. Another basic principle is the 
prohibition against ex post facto criminal laws with its derivative rule of non-retroactive 
application of criminal laws and criminal sanctions. 
 
When it is a question of state responsibility, it is much less disputable to apply a 
“generous” interpretation. (cf. the cases of the ICJ). Thus, in the field of criminal law 
with individual responsibility, one has to be more careful regarding a wide 
interpretation despite the graveness and enormity of the crime. These different values 




5.3.3 Criticism of the subjective approach 
The subjective interpretation has its weaknesses. It is problematic to define as genocide 
acts against a group that might not have a real objective existence. A consequence of 
this approach may be that a group is identified as a certain group on wrong assumptions. 
In general, the law cannot permit that the crime is defined by the offender alone. 
Consequently, it is necessary to establish some objective existence of the four groups.169 
As above mentioned there is thus a mixture of both objective and subjective criteria.  
 
Furthermore it is argued that there are several references to the term “group” in Art. II 
of the Convention. The term is used in both the chapeau where the subjective element 
(the mens rea) of the crime is described, as well as in the five paragraphs which follow. 
It is pointed out that if the term “groups” had only been mentioned in the chapeau, that 







169 See William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law, 2000, p.110 
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identify genocidal intent in situations where the accused himself believed that such a 
group actually existed. But this is not the case. The term “group” is used in the 
following paragraphs and Art. II requires that the acts of genocide are directed against 
“members of the group” (Art. II a-e).170
 
 
5.4 Later developments 
5.4.1 ICTY Jurisprudence  
5.4.1.1 The “stable and permanent”-theory 
The “stable and permant”-theory regarding the protected groups introduced in the 
Akayesu-case is supported by the ICTY in the Jelisic-case.171 The ICTY Trial Chamber 
states that the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention shows that there was a 
desire to limit the field of application of the Convention to protecting “stable” groups. 
The groups should be defined objectively and the members of the group belonged to it 
automatically and regardless of their own desires.172
  
5.4.1.2 Subjective approach 
The subjective approach regarding the establishment of a protected group as set out in 
the Akayesu-case and followed up in the later ICTR jurisprudence, is used in the Jelisic-







170 William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law, 2000, p.110-111 
171 Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case No..IT-95-10-T, Judgement 14 December 1999.Goran Jelisic, an acting 
commander of Luka prison camp in the former Yugoslavia, was found guilty on war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s sentence of 40 years 
imprisonment 
172 Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case No..IT-95-10-T, Judgement 14 December 1999, para.69 
173 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. ICTY-T-98-33, Judgement of 2 August 2001.  
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In the Jelisic-case, the Trial Chamber, when seeking to define a religious group174, 
states that despite that the objective determination of a protected group is still possible, 
they find it more “appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial 
group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single out that group from the 
rest of the community”175. Furthermore the ICTY Trial Chamber states that it elects a 
subjective criterion when evaluating whether there exists membership in a national, 
ethnical or racial group. The Trial Chamber argues that the stigmatisation of a group as 
a distinct national, ethnical or racial by the community is the essential and that this 
stigmatisation allows the group to be determined whether a targeted population 
constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes of the perpetrator. Then the 
Trial Chamber concludes that a protected group can be stigmatised by positive or 
negative criteria. A “positive approach” does consist of the perpetrator “distinguishing a 
group by the characteristics which they deem to be particular to a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group”176. A negative approach implies identifying individuals as 
not being part of a group to which the perpetrators consider that they themselves belong 
to and which to them displays certain national, ethnical, racial or religious 
characteristics. Thus, all individuals would then make up a distinct group by means of 
exclusion.177
 
In the Krstic-case, the ICTY Trial Chamber first holds that the Genocide Convention 
does not protect all types of human groups. It is only to be applied on national, ethnical, 







174 In the ICTY-cases, defining of a religious group has been the main issue as opposed to the ICTR 
where the definition of an ethnic group has been the main challenge  
175 Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case No..IT-95-10-T, Judgement of 14 December 1999, para.70 
176 Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case No..IT-95-10-T, Judgement 14 December 1999, para.71  
177 Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case No..IT-95-10-T, Judgement 14 December 1999, para.71 
178 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. ICTY-T-98-33, Judgement of 2 August 2001, para.478 
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groups are clearly defined, neither in the Convention or elsewhere, and then refers to the 
Convention’s preparatory work and the work conducted by international bodies in 
relation to the protection of minorities which, in the Trial Chamber’s view, implies that 
the concepts of protected groups and national minorities overlap and are sometimes 
synonymous. The Trial Chamber refers to European instruments on human rights which 
use the term “national minorities”179, while universal human rights instruments more 
often refer to “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities”180and concludes that the two 
different expressions seem to embrace the same goals. The Trial Chamber then goes to a 
study conducted for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities in 1979, where F. Capotorti stated that “the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities decided, in 1950, to 
replace the word ‘racial’ by the word ‘ethnic’ in all references to minority groups 
described by their ethnic origin.”181 The Trial Chamber goes on by referring to the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
which defines racial discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” 182  The Trial 
Chamber then goes back to the Genocide Convention’s preparatory work which reveals 
that the term “ethnical” was actually added at a later stage to improve the definition of 
the type of protected groups in the Genocide Convention and ensuring that the term 







179 Cf. Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as [...] association 
with a national minority [...]” 
180 Cf. Art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “In those States in which 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied 
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language” 
181 Cf. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. ICTY-T-98-33, Judgement of 2 August 2001, para.555 and F. 
Capotorti, Study on the Rights of the Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979), para.197, referring to the debates held on a draft resolution on 
the definition of minorities (E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/103) 
182 UNTS, vol. 660, no. 9646, Art.1 
183 See UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 
  51 
                                                
the Trial Chamber argues that the preparatory work shows that making a list of 
protected groups was aimed more at describing a single phenomenon and approximately 
refer to what was recognised as “national minorities” rather than referring to several 
distinct prototypes of groups of individuals. Thus, the Trial Chamber concludes that 
using a scientifically objective criteria to differ each of the protected groups would be 
inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. In addition, the 
Trial Chamber states; when identifying a group’s cultural, religious, ethnical or national 
characteristics, the identification has to be done “within the socio-historic context which 
it inhabits”. 184   
 
 
5.4.2 The UN Report on Darfur 
In a recent report of 25 January 2005 of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, (hereafter the “Commission”)185 the 
question of protected groups was discussed. The Commission’s186 mandate was to 
establish whether it had taken place genocide in Darfur (Sudan).187
 
The Commission refers extensively to the jurisprudence of the ICTR in the report. It 
first states that the Rwandan genocide in 1994 revealed the limitations on the 
international rules on the area of genocide. Furthermore the report holds that this lack of 







184 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. ICTY-T-98-33, Judgement of 2 August 2001, para.556-557 
185 Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004 
186 Appointed by the UN Secretary-General IN October 2004. Members: Antonio Cassese (Chairperson), 
Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Therese Striggner-Scott 
187 The Commission found that genocide did not occur in Darfur. The Commission found that some of the 
objective elements of genocide materialized. However, the Commission found a lack of genocidal intent 
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interpretation to those rules.”188 Then the report refers to the Akayesu-case and the 
Trial Chamber’s use of both objective and subjective criteria for establishing an ethnic 
group (first, the distinction between the Tutsi and the Hutu made by the Belgian 
colonizers. Secondly, that this distinction was confirmed by the self-perception of the 
members of both the Tutsi- and the Hutu-groups). Moreover, the report refers to the 
objective criterion “stable and permanent group”. It states that this criterion “could be 
held to be rather questionable.”189 However, the report continues that the “stable and 
permanent” principle was “supplemented in the ICTR case law (and subsequently in 
that of the ICTY) by the subjective standard of perception and self-perception as 
member of a group”.190 The report concludes that according to the ICTR and ICTY case 
law, one should in cases of doubt, establish whether 1) a set of human beings are 
perceived and in fact treated as belonging to one of the protected groups, and in addition 
2) they consider themselves as belonging to one of such groups.191 Here the report refers 
to the Kayishena and Ruzindana-, Musema and Rutanagnda-cases from the ICTR and 
the Jelisic- and Kristic-cases of the ICTY. 
 
 Consequently, the report states; 
“…the approach taken to determine whether a group is a (fully) protected one has 
evolved from an objective to a subjective standard to take into account that “collective 
identities and in particular ethnicity, are by their very nature social constructs, 
“imagined” identities entirely dependent on variable and contingent perceptions, and 









188 Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, Section II, para.10. Available at 
www.ohchr.org/english/darfur.htm 
189Ibid, para.10 
190 Ibid, para.10 
191 Ibid, para.10 
192 Ibid, para.11 
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The Commission behind the report considers the ICTR’s subjective test to be a 
“usefully supplement and develop, or at least elaborate upon the standard laid down in 
the 1948 Convention and the corresponding customary rules on genocide.”193 
Furthermore, the report points out that the legal situation prior to the ICTR case law was 
not satisfactory as the Genocide Convention provisions and customary rules were 
“either too loose or too rigid”, and that they were not able to take account of situations 
where there was a conflict between two distinct sets of persons, where one part carried 
out the actus reus with the intent to destroy the other group in whole or in part. The 
Commission moreover stresses the vital importance of the process of a formation of a 
perception and self-perception of another group as distinct (on the basis of ethnicity, 
nationality, religion or race). The Commission states that this may start out as a 
subjective view when regarding the other group as different and as opposed to one’s 
own group. This view gradually crystallizes and hardens into what the Commission 
describes as a “real and factual opposition” which leads to an objective contrast. Thus, 
the Commission holds that the subjective becomes objective. Legally, the Commission 
states that the ICTR’s (and ICTY) expansive interpretation regarding the protected 
groups which includes any “stable and permanent” group which can be differentiated on 
one of the grounds contemplated by the Genocide Convention and corresponding 
customary rules is in accordance with the “object and scope of genocide”.194. 
Furthermore, the Commission holds that the Tribunal’s expansive interpretation 
regarding the protected groups does not substantially depart from the text of the 
Genocide Convention and the customary rules because “it too hinges on four categories 
of groups which, however, are not longer identified only by their objective connotations 
but also on the basis of the subjective perceptions of the members of groups”. Then the 







193 Ibid, para.12 
194 Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, Section II, para.13 
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the Commission concludes; “It may therefore be safely held that that interpretation and 
expansion has become part and parcel of international customary law.”195
 
When applying the law on the Darfur-case, the Commission specifically focused on two 
constitutive elements; i) whether the different tribes that had been the victims of the 
killings objectively made up a protected group and; ii) whether the perpetrators had 
genocidal intent. The Commission was in Darfur faced with many of the same 
challenges as the ICTR regarding the constitution of an ethnic group. The victims had 
the same language and religion as the perpetrators and due to frequent intermarriage, the 
groups could hardly be distinguished. The Commission found that the main distinctions 
between the groups were their respectively sedentary and nomadic character and some 
difference in their dialects. The Commission then went on to carry out a subjective test; 
could the groups constitute protected groups, despite not fulfilling the objective 
elements still constitute a protective group based on a how they perceive themselves and 
how they are perceived by others. After a consideration/discussion the Commission 
concludes that in the Darfur-case, the tribes subjectively made up a protected group and 
that the requirement was fulfilled as such.196 However, the Commission found that the 
perpetrators did not have genocidal intent and concluded that genocide had not 
occurred. Thus, it is to be noted that the Commission here carry out a subjective 
standard when investigating whether the targeted groups in Darfur was a protected 
group within the definition of the Genocide Comvention. 
 
Regarding the legal value of this report, one must bear in mind that it is a report, not a 







195 Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, Section II, para.13 
196 Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, Section II, para.21-24 
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qualified members (with Antonio Cassese as chairman) and such a report will to some 
extent give a picture of what the state of law is.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 It is generally agreed that the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and 
the ICTR significantly has contributed and influenced today’s understanding of the 
crime of genocide.197 As these are the first tribunals where genocide has been 
thoroughly examined the ICTR and the ICTR has had a unique opportunity, as well as 
an obligation, to develop the law. Before the ICTR delivered the Akayesu-case, the 
Genocide Convention had been a forgotten and almost antiquated treaty. The ICTR was 
the first international jurisdiction to pass judgement on the crime of genocide ever since 
the adoption of the Genocide Convention. Its contribution to the development in the 
interpretation of the crime of genocide is considered to have built “a jurisprudence that 
forms the work of other international criminal tribunals, such as the ICTY, other 
temporary institutions and in the future the ICC. National courts in a number of 
countries have relied on the ICTR decisions when these courts have been called on to 
adjudicate human rights cases”.198
 
Thus, the jurisprudence of the ICTR has developed the interpretation of the crime of 
genocide and has established fundamental precedents in that area of international 
criminal law for other jurisdictions, including the permanent International Criminal 
Court. The ICTR (followed up by the ICTY) has used the Genocide Convention of 







197 Cf. Andreas Zimmermann, Prosecuting the Crime of Genocide: The Role of National Courts, 
International Criminal Tribunals and the International Court of Justice, Mennesker og Rettigheter nr.2, 
2003 
198 Dinah L. Shelton (ed. in chief) Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, volume 2, 
p.554 
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situation. The ICTR interpretation regarding the protected groups has been expansive 
and the ICTR has contributed widely regarding the issue of the protected groups. 
 
As regards to the protected groups of the Genocide Convention, the ICTR has 
established the “stable and permanent”-theory. Though it is has been discussed and 
criticised, it has still made precedent and is used by other legal instruments today.199
Moreover, the development of a subjective standard of perception and self-perception as 
a supplement to the objective elements has clearly contributed to an increased flexibility 
in the interpretation of the protected groups. The determination of what constitutes a 
protected group has thus gradually evolved from an objective to a subjective standard. 
This development shows the emphasis on that ethnic is in itself a social phenomenon, an 
“imagined” identity based on changing and often contingent perceptions and not on 
constant and verifiable social facts. The ICTR’s jurisprudence has thus, still having in 
mind that some of the innovative interpretations are disputed, contributed to make the 









199 Report to the UN Secretary General by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, Section II, para.10 
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